Abraham, The Quintessential Scientist

Believe it or not all science, all those sublime equations that describe how things work are predicated on one principle, which most self-described 'scientists' seem, understandably, ignorant of (perhaps because by banishing philosophy, which involves speculations of an ontological nature, they've closed the door to it). Think about it, the stellar monuments that science has built in the last hundred and fifty years; the atom, electromagnetism, Relativity, quantum mechanics, information technology etc.., all have their root in the early investigations of the phenomenon of motion. It simply boils down to this. All scientific progress is a question of how advanced our knowledge is regarding this principle, as it applies to different fields of knowledge, but really as it pertains to the universe as a whole.

Our civilization graduated from the crude, but foundational observations of Aristotle, to those of Galileo, Descartes and beyond, throughout it, we've not been replacing one system with another; classical physics, for instance, had not been made redundant by the likes of Galileo and Kepler, but those people's work take place within the paradigmatic world inaugurated by the peripatetic philosophy of nature. Those scarcely understood Aristotelean principles found in the physics and 'On The Heavens' pertaining to elements, nature etc... are by no means fantastical, they're a general outline of the comprehensive forces of nature, so to speak. The studious scholar asks, what does he mean by fire?, can this element (fire) be abstracted in such a way as to be seen as a universal 'property'? or a constituent in all things whatsoever?, can the elemental 'fire', be found in a form other than its purest?. if so, then Aristotle's doctrine of elements has not ceased to be relevant.

'What modern physics is, is a 'deepening' of this system of crude 'forces'; the discovery of relations which the sheer generality of the Greek predecessor could not account for. Every progress, every step we strode in the path of scientific enlightenment was the impetus of a methodological shift, a new point of view hitherto obscured and unknown to earlier pioneers in the field. Aristotle's 'physics' was 'outgrown'?, by no means!. It's precisely the text that modern physicists lost in the dark void of space and time need to return to, for, it's not so much the mathematics that we're short of, but the 'principles'--general and sufficient enough principles.

A modern definition of motion based on mechanics, vs a classical definition (Aristotle's). The modern definition is based on the principle of 'relativity'.

As we see (below), Aristotle defines motion not only the perceptible 'change' in location, but metaphysically, as the transition from potentiality to actuality. The former, in this description, is only explainable by the latter, since Aristotle likes to define things in terms of the 'first cause'.

“Motion is a first entelechy of that which is in potentiality, insofar as it is in potentiality, and if you prefer you may say that it is a transition from potentiality to actuality.” this is a definition of Aristotle's concept of motion by a medieval Arab commentator.

the Cartesian and Aristotlean definitions, which represent two different scientific attitudes, are beautifully synthesized in Leibniz's, as rephrased by Cassirer

"Motion concieved as a mere change of place in the purely phoronomical sense, he explains, remains always something purely relative; it only becomes an expression of a true physcial and metaphysical reality when we add to it an inner dynamic principle, a force concieved as an originally implanted principle of permenance and change"

Substance& Function, And Einstein's Theory Of Relativity (p363)

The Quran's Definition

Does motion, as understood 'scientifically', occur in the Quran?. Yes, just as space and time do. The thing is, Quranic descriptions of motion are unintelligible if approached with our modern (physical) conceptions of motion in mind because the latter principally takes as its object, empirical phenomena; i.e actions made by objects, physical forces and the like, whereas the Quran's is closer to Aristotle, in that its approach is more 'ontological'--always in reference to some 'first cause'.

Every proposition concerning motion in the Quran, derives from a single principle which, interestingly, occurs in the work of Aristotle (as well as Plato). This principle is ultimate, and is a standard of measurement by means of which all 'action' is judged, even finding application in deontological matters. It occurs in the Quran as 'Sujood'; a perfect example of this is the story of Abraham as narrated in Chapter 6 (al-an'am, verses 75-79)

Abraham's search for God was simultaneously a treatise on motion. It shows, among other things, the essentially 'deontic' nature of motion. Needing only the aid of the heavenly canvas to form a conception of the principle, Abraham was acquainted (by he whom he was searching after) with the principle that's the very 'engine' of life. He saw a constellation, the moon, and sun, thinking, as he saw each object, that he was beholding God; the bigger and more, let's say, 'majestic', the object was, the more 'divine' it appeared to him, but something went wrong each time that completely overturned his assumptions. They were 'shifty'; they did not stick around, their 'majesty' was only fleeting, 'pretensive', approximative. It took three times for this to happen, i.e for each object to make a majestic appearance and 'shift' out of sight, for Abraham to make out the principle. But how is that?

Because, what each object expressed, as it turned up and faded, was not 'impermanence', but something more like Bradley's Regress. A phenomenon rooted in the mind itself, NOT the object it's beholding.

As might be called, rather disagreeably, the 'typical scientific attitude'; at some point, a critical, or in Heidegger's terms 'presence-at-hand' vision arises out of the merely 'aesthetically-pleasing', so that the observer passes from delighting over the 'allure' of a rainbow after a heavy bout of rain to the phenomenon of scattering, which he temporarily (and in the same manner) delights over until he passes over to light, then to particles, to atoms, etc... Ever-so mysteriously, the object of delight is dimmed as it's reduced or deconstructed into relations (the term 'scattering' proves very appropriate here...~). Perhaps the 'magnificence' of the object expresses its inherent 'totality'.

This is clearly shown in Abraham's case in the expression 'Afala' أَفَلَ, an expression whose connotations exceed what's normally ascribed to it. The object's 'disappearance' or 'setting' or 'fading' (however it's translated) is to be taken in its full sense, Bradley's sense, the British thinker whose Appearance & Reality walks us through this sense of 'disappearance' (as denoted by Afala). This Stanford article passage captures it...

"Bradley argued that a particular thing (a lump of sugar) is nothing more than a bundle of qualities (whiteness, sweetness, and hardness) unified into a cohesive whole via a relation of some sort. But relations, for Bradley, were deeply problematic. Conceived as “independent” from their relata, they would themselves need further relations to relate them to the original relata, and so on ad infinitum. Conceived as “internal” to their relata, they would not relate qualities at all, and would also need further relations to relate them to qualities. From this, Bradley concluded that a relational unity of qualities is unattainable and, more generally, that relations are incoherent and should not be thought of as real"

Bradley's Regress Standford Article

Perhaps, the initial, 'impressionable' beauty of the object, is, once critically dismantled, is shown to not belong to the object, but a 'guise', a simulacrum, a 'lure'--into that to whom said 'beauty' and 'elusiveness' truly belongs. Scientific critique wants to reach an ultimate object of some sort, and each progress it makes, is a progress in that direction. It wants to stop, no doubt, but the 'comprehensibility' of each of its 'ultimate' objects--whatever it finds most 'pressing' at the time, thwarts an expectation, and motion, as the 'metaphysic' of 'becoming', finds its true definition here....

Thus the mysterious constellation (Kawkab كَوْكَبًۭا ۖ), the moon (Qamar ٱلْقَمَرَ), lastly the sun (Shames ٱلشَّمْسَ) respectively were, to the critical Abraham, as pressing as whatever theory modern science finds most 'difficult' and 'inscrutable' (from an ontological perspective, The Quran captures this 'sense' by the term 'Kabeer'--'confounding', 'elusive' ) at any given time, (string theory?, whichever..). What happened each time, was that 'Abraham', in temporarily 'absolutizing' each object, discerned it, upon reflection, to be no more than that which it constitutes and thereby what it's constituted by. We share in this interpretation Hegel's assertion regarding the relativity of the absolute; As expressed in the phrase

"in Being everything is immediate, in Essence everything is relative"

The 'absoluteness' of each object dissolves before a more transcendental point of view, and an irreducible 'thing', is superseded by a mereological view in which, e.g the Moon is rendered 'that part' which serves 'this function' in this larger, more 'inscrutable 'scheme of things' which is the new absolute, and thus the 'moon' is nothing but this particular 'schema'.

Hegel uses the various ‘definitions of the Absolute’ to characterise the successive philosophical standpoints shown to be in fact relative in the development of the Absolute Idea

Thus Abraham's intellectual journey is uniquely universal. Afala' أَفَلَ, thus, is a crucial term, which finds it meaning in an understanding of 'motion' that pertains to the way in which we transition from a 'lower' or narrower standpoint, to a higher, 'broader' standpoint.Thus the Sun there, is a component in the larger cosmic system, and its 'absoluteness' is deferred to that, and so on; until we reach something that's not a component or constituent, and is not definable in terms of a transcendental system.

More reasons can be given for why such things as the sun, moon etc.. cannot be 'absolute'.

They seemed more so as 'functions' or 'processes' than divine. Their monotone mode of being, their revolutions, their mechanical operation, don't express divinity as such, but 'role', a specific role at that. To the critical viewer, they are yielding themselves, serving something that's other than themselves. They are moving things, he will think, moving in about the same general way as can be said about all life forms; you can't help but be 'human', to think and act like one, so is the tree, the stone, the sun and moon, are all, in a sense, 'agents'. As Spinoza put it in the Ethics “Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being” (E3p6). Your 'humanity' is something to which you are 'subject', to which you subject that which isn't 'human', and of which you're a representative, it's encoded into you, and that's all you know. You're, therefore, programmed, though are alotted a considerable degree of freedom within the bounds of the program, which, as we noted in the essay on sujood, does not incapacitate, but orients.

This 'mode of being', i.e the fact that each thing 'strives' to persevere in its being', and that, it can only express what it happens to be, is one of the hallmarks of Aristotlean thinking, and 'nature' in Greek thought is precisely that dialectic of 'being' and 'self-expression'. This feature is what the young Abraham must have ascertained once it had occurred frequently enough. Our subjectivity to our 'nature'; the subjectivity of the sun to the principle which it embodies, naturally gives rise to the opposite idea; if all things without exception are but expedients of principles inhering in them, then to whom, are they 'expressing' said 'principles', who, are they performing this wonderful task for?; to whom is 'expediency' itself, expedient?.

You may say, to the principle itself, i.e, that a human expresses, and is therefore 'expedient' to 'humanity', which is true, but it leads to the question 'to whom' is humanity, as a principle expedient?. Fearing the bugbear of 'infinite regress' some may avoid the question all together, but this is actually a good sign. Infinite regress is by no means a paradox. Once 'encountered', we should take it as a sign that we've come upon the ultimate principle itself. Infinite regress means that any explanatory 'regression' beyond this point is superfluous, IF, the aim to define a point beyond which no more regress is possible. In other words, said 'point', said absolute, is the postulate itself that enable us to embark on the scheme. Had the question of said ultimate principle not been possible, had it not existed, no such 'questions' could have arisen. Thus the phenomenon of motion itself, the way in which we move from one standpoint, to a higher, more 'comprehensive' one, testifies to the reality of the true absolute. Such must have been Abraham's conclusion...

Now take this point, hold onto it.

Every scientific investigation starts with a postulate. This postulate (or hypothesis) must, in order to give way to 'enquiry', possess more reality than those things which it 'constitutes'; in fact, the postulate fuels, and thereby 'moves', analysis. Not only is it the incentive behind the whole project, but it's also the stimulus that stimulates us into moving from one point to another. The deontic dimension is glimpsed in how this functioning guides the investigator, thus giving a definite 'form' to the scheme, and all questions (which are its 'means' of moving the analysis further) are contradictions which it spurs in us for precisely this purpose; as Plato put it "Much in perception is a paraclete of thought" (Cassirer, p368)

Thinking, itself, being a sequence of judgements, is, as some would define it "subsuming a particular under a universal" (Gadamar Truth & Method, p27--'judgement') proceeds in that manner; by means of a postulate or 'rule', it assembles and arranges the content of experience in a specific way, this 'principle' is always 'hidden', applied 'mechanically'; the purest example of this is found in mathematics

Consider the following operation 5+7 = 12, and think about it this way; 5+7 is a process, not a 'fact', but something that's 'happening'. The operator selects 5 and 7 separately. Joining these two number can be thought of as the 'doing' of 12, meaning that, 12 is what joins 5 to 7; or, is the 'rule' according to which we join 5 and 7. In this sense, 12 is 'prior' to the addition procedure, and not the result, though we don't think of it as such when the two numbers (5&7) are added. Thus, rather than seeing 12 as the result of 5+7, such that 5+7 =12, we see 5+7 as the result of 12, such that 12 = 5+7, this way we get a 12 that's the rule or universal under which fall 6 distinct 'propositions'

(1+11)(2+10)(3+9)(4+8)(5+7)(6+6)

Now as in basic mathematical equations so is the case everywhere, the result is strangely 'prior' to the operation, and in so being, it's turned it into a principle of motion, it becomes, in Aristotle's phrase a 'final cause' (the analogue for Hegel's absolute, which is relative). What we mean to say us that Abraham's meditation, insofar as it had 'God' as its 'aim', already had God' as the 'principle' (the '12' in this scheme). And in the same fashion that the rule systematically predicates its relations, the content as well as the specific way in which they're arranged, as 12 predicates the above 6 proposition, so would having the true absolute, God, as the 'rule' engenders 'propositions' appropriate to it. Thus the shrewd, reflective philosopher would ask, what is the 'criterion' of judgement, on the basis of which I agreed, objected, defined etc..

Abraham's meditation showed that 'existing' is 'existing-as' (as-structure in Hiedagger), that all entities, especially the sun, which has a symbolic import that makes it the an appropriate final test, are limited to and by their nature, but that which created them, and assigned to them those very natures and roles, cannot be, because 'existence' is ab initio 'limiting', it involves 'existing' in a particular 'closed' sphere. GOD cannot 'exist', because, such questions could only arise from a limited world view, and asking whether God 'exists' is fallacious as it posits 'existence' as a higher notion, and subjects the creator of existence to his creation.

Aristotle's investigations regarding motion led him to the famous dictum of the 'unmoved mover', the final cause of all movement, and how a final cause works is by being the 'object' towards which a thing strives, in being both, its postulate and objective; in the Quran, we find the statement that God is the 'First and the Last' (chp57 'Al-Hadid, V3), and that he's the one who "Originates and Resurrects" (chp85 'Al-Buruj, V13). Since all science, whether it studies complex chemical reactions in botany, or equations in qauntum field theory, or marine biology, or geology, are united by one object. They are all Abrahamic meditations of one form or another, the trial and error, the misjudgements, inescapable in many ways, committed throughout the meditation catalogues the intellectual vicissitudes of the scientist, for all scientists as they're immersed in their own field of study are after the same thing which Abraham 'consciously' was, whether they know it or not, hence why we said that what we're short of is not so much the 'means', but awareness of the principle that rears every force in the universe.

Abraham, unlike the scientist, knew this from the beginning, and though he hadn't our modern 'means', but only three simple cases, the cognizence and will which he expressed in his search places him on a much higher plane. Such a 'conscious' orientation is truly what's meant by the term 'Islam'; a definition of which was given in the previous essay in the phrase

"Sujood is the quintessential motion, and Islam the quintessential sujood, meaning that Islam is the quintessential motion"